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Abstract 
Zero-day or unknown malware are created using code 
obfuscation techniques that can modify the parent code to 
produce offspring copies which have the same 
functionality but with different signatures. Current 
techniques reported in literature lack the capability of 
detecting zero-day malware with the required accuracy 
and efficiency. In this paper, we have proposed and 
evaluated a novel method of employing several data 
mining techniques to detect and classify zero-day 
malware with high levels of accuracy and efficiency 
based on the frequency of Windows API calls.  
This paper describes the methodology employed for the 
collection of large data sets to train the classifiers, and 
analyses the performance results of the various data 
mining algorithms adopted for the study using a fully 
automated tool developed in this research to conduct the 
various experimental investigations and evaluation. 
Through the performance results of these algorithms from 
our experimental analysis, we are able to evaluate and 
discuss the advantages of one data mining algorithm over 
the other for accurately detecting zero-day malware 
successfully.  
    The data mining framework employed in this research 
learns through analysing the behavior of existing 
malicious and benign codes in large datasets. We have 
employed robust classifiers, namely Naïve Bayes (NB) 
Algorithm, k−Nearest Neighbor (kNN) Algorithm, 
Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO) Algorithm with 
4 differents kernels (SMO - Normalized PolyKernel, 
SMO – PolyKernel, SMO – Puk, and SMO- Radial Basis 
Function (RBF)), Backpropagation Neural Networks 
Algorithm, and J48 decision tree and have evaluated their 
performance.  
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Overall, the automated data mining system 
implemented for this study has achieved high true positive 
(TP) rate of more than 98.5%, and low false positive (FP) 
rate of less than 0.025, which has not been achieved in 
literature so far. This is much higher than the required 
commercial acceptance level indicating that our novel 
technique is a major leap forward in detecting zero-day 
malware. This paper also offers future directions for 
researchers in exploring different aspects of obfuscations 
that are affecting the IT world today. 
Keywords:  Malware, Intrusion Detection, Obfuscation, 
API. 
1 Introduction 
Windows API enables the programs to exploit the power 
of Windows and hence malware authors make use of the 
API calls to perform malicious actions (Tamada et al. 
2006; Sharif et al. 2008; Choi et al. 2009; Alazab, 
Venkatraman & Watters 2010). This approach has 
enabled malware authors to adopt various obfuscation 
techniques, thereby posing a major challenge to the 
existing Anti-Virus (AV) detection engines.  Literature 
provides several approaches being investigated to thwart 
such malware, and among these approaches, data mining 
methods have been more successful in detecting these 
recent malware that adopt API calls for infecting the 
executables (Symantec Enterprise Security, 1997; Sung et 
al. 2004; Kolter & Maloof 2006).  However, due to the 
requirement of high accuracy in the case of malware 
detection with very low false positives, such methods 
have not been effective in the practical world 
(Venkatraman, 2010; RSA, 2011; Symantec Enterprise 
Security, 2011).  In this research, we have employed a 
novel and effective method of extracting API call features 
and in training the classifiers using several data mining 
techniques for an efficient detection of obfuscated 
malware that lead to zero-day (unknown) attacks of 
today.   
 
1.1 Malware Obfuscation 
The term obfuscation means modifying the program code 
in a way to preserve its functionally with the aim to 
reduce vulnerability to any kind of static analysis and to 
deter reverse engineering by making the code difficult to 
understand and less readable (Linn & Debray 2003). 
Obfuscation techniques such as packing, polymorphism 
and metamorphism are used by malware authors as well 
as legitimate software developers (Alazab, Venkatraman 
& Watters 2009). They both use code obfuscation 
techniques for different reasons. Code obfuscation is very 
effectively used by malware authors to evade antivirus 
scanners since it modifies the program code to produce 
offspring copies which have the same functionality but 
with different byte sequence or „virus signature‟ that is 
not recognized by antivirus scanners (Rabek et al. 2003).  
 
1.2 Windows API Calls 
Windows API calling sequence reflects the behaviour of 
executables. The Windows API function calls fall under 
various functional levels such as system services, user 
interfaces, network resources, windows shell and 
libraries. Since the API calls reflect the functional levels 
of a program, analysis of the API calls would lead to an 
understanding of the behaviour of the file. Malicious 
codes are able to disguise their behaviour by using API 
functions provided under Win32 environment to 
implement their tasks. Therefore, in binary static analysis, 
the focus is on identifying all documented Windows API 
call features to understand the malware behaviour.  
In the Windows operating system, user applications 
rely on the interface provided within a set of libraries, 
such as KERNEL32.DLL, NTDLL.DLL and 
USER32.DLL in order to access system resources 
including files, processes, network information and the 
registry. This interface is known as the Win32 API. 
Applications may also call functions in NTDLL.DLL 
known as the Native API. The Native API functions 
perform system calls in order to have the kernel provide 
the requested service. In our previous works (Alazab 
2010; Alazab et al. 2010; Alazab, Venkatraman & 
Watters 2010) we have demonstrated how to extract and 
analyse these API call features including hooking of the 
system services that are responsible to manage files. The 
extracted calls are confined to those that affect the files. 
Various features related to the calls that create or modify 
files or even get information from the file to change some 
value and information about the DLLs that are loaded by 
the malware before the actual execution are considered 
for the analysis. 
 
1.3 Need for the Study 
Recently, API calls have been explored for modeling 
program behaviour. There are studies (Choi et al. 2009) 
(Tamada et al. 2006) (Park et al. 2008b) (Park et al. 
2008a) that have used analysis of API calls for generation 
of birthmark on portable execution.  Use of statistical 
analysis of file binary content including statistical N-
gram modeling techniques (Stolfo, Wang & Li 2005) 
(Wang et al. 2009) have been tested in identifying 
malcode in document files and does not have sufficient 
resolution to represent all class of file types.  From other 
study on related work (Venkatraman 2009) (Bruschi, 
Martignoni & Monga 2006) (MetaPHOR 2010) (Perriot 
& Ferrie 2004) (Ferrie & Szor 2001) (Ferrie & Szor 
2001) (Linn & Debray 2003) (Chang & Atallah 2002),  it 
has been found that the statistical modeling of hidden 
malcode that predominantly use Windows API calling 
sequence for evading detection is yet to be explored.  
This is a motivation for this research towards a positive 
contribution in understanding malware behavior through 
statistical analyses of API calls.    
The analysis of computer system performed offline is 
called static analysis, which has been employed in this 
research to study the patterns of the API calls within 
binary executables by reverse engineering the code.  
Static analysis provides a better understanding of the 
anomalous behavior patterns of the code since we adopt a 
methodology to perform a deep analysis into the code 
program and their statistical properties. The existing 
techniques and methods exhibit false positives as they do 
not perform sufficient statistical analysis to determine if 
the anomaly was „actually‟ malicious (Jacob et al., 2008; 
Symantec Enterprise Security, 2011). Therefore, in this 
research, static anomaly-based detection analysis is 
adopted to perform introspection of the program code 
with the goal of determining various dynamic properties 
of API function calls that are extracted from these codes 
in an isolated environment. 
The results of the following recent studies have been 
the prime motivation for this research: 1) malware 
authors are able to easily fool the detection engine by 
applying obfuscation techniques on known malwares 
(Sharif et al. 2008), 2) identifying benign files as malware 
(false positive) is becoming very high (Symantec 
Enterprise Security 2011), 3) failing to detect obfuscated 
malware is high (false negative) (Symantec Enterprise 
Security 2011) (Symantec Enterprise Security 2010) 
(Symantec Enterprise Security 2009), 4) the current 
detection rate is decreasing, and 5) current malware 
detectors are unable to detect zero day attacks (Symantec 
Enterprise Security 2011) (RSA 2011). These results 
imply that code obfuscation has become a challenge for 
digital forensic examiners  with the limitations of 
signature based detection (Tang, Zhou & Zuo 2010) 
(Santos et al. 2009).   
2 Data Mining 
In the recent years, data mining has become the focus of 
many malware researchers for detecting unknown 
Malware or to classify malware from benign files. Data 
mining is usually referred to as knowledge discovery in 
databases. Frawley et al. (Frawley, Piatetsky-shapiro & 
Matheus 1992) define it as “The nontrivial extraction of 
implicit, previously unknown, and potentially useful 
information from data”. It is also defined as ”The science 
of extracting useful information from large data sets or 
databases” (Hand, Mannila & Smyth 2001). In this 
research, data mining involves the application of a full 
suite of statistical and machine learning algorithms on a 
set of features derived from malicious and clean 
programs.  
 Features form the input data to the detection systems, 
and features can be used as patterns for classification in 
malware detection systems.  Reverse engineering of 
executables results in extracted features useful for two 
types of detections: i) Host-Based Intrusion Detection 
System (HIDS) – to check, analyse and monitor the 
computer system internally such as extract byte 
sequences, ASCII, instruction sequences, and API call 
sequences, and ii) Network-Based Intrusion Detection 
system (NIDS) – to detect malicious activity by 
monitoring network traffic such as denial of service 
(DOS) attacks, port scans.   
A data mining approach to malware detection usually 
involves employing statistical methods for classification. 
Each classification algorithm constructs a model, using 
machine learning, to represent the benign and malicious 
classes. In this approach, a labeled training set is required 
to build the class models during a process of supervised 
learning. Many statistical classification algorithms exist 
including Naive Bayes (NB) Algorithm, k−Nearest 
Neighbor (kNN) Algorithm, Sequential Minimal 
Optimization (SMO) Algorithm with 4 different kernels 
(SMO - Normalized PolyKernel, SMO – PolyKernel, 
SMO – Puk, and SMO- Radial Basis Function (RBF)), 
Backpropagation Neural Networks Algorithm, Logistic 
Regression, and J48 decision tree. The key to statistical 
classification is to represent the malicious and benign 
samples in an appropriate manner to enable the 
classification algorithms to work effectively. Feature 
extraction is an important component of effective 
classification, and an associated feature vector that can 
accurately represent the invariant characteristics in the 
training sets and query samples is highly desirable. 
Classification is the process of classifying data into two 
or more predetermined groups based on features. 
   
2.1 Related Study 
Data mining techniques for malware detection usually 
starts with the first step of generating a feature set. In 
2005, studies reported in (Malan & Smith 2005) that a 
temporal consistency element was added to the system 
call frequency to calculate the frequency of API system 
call sequences. Similarity measures were calculated using 
edit distance and Measuring Similarity with Intersection. 
The first measure was on ordered sets of native API 
system calls, while the second one was on unordered sets. 
Both similarity measures based on API gave the 
probabilities of two peers. The drawback is that they had 
considered only native API call features.  
Static Analysis for Vicious Executables (SAVE)  
(Sung et al. 2004) is another work based on API calls 
made in an attempt to detect polymorphic and 
metamorphic malwares. They defined signature as an API 
sequence of calls and started the reverse engineering 
process from decompressed 16 binaries, which are then 
passed through a PE file parser. Next, they extracted and 
mapped the sequence of Windows API calls, and lastly 
passed them through the similarity measure module, 
where similarity measures such as, Euclidian distance, 
Sequence alignment, Cosine measure, extended Jaccard 
measure, and the Pearson correlation measure were used. 
Binary executables under inspection is classified by 
identifying a high similarity to a known instance of 
malware in the training set.  Although these similarity 
measures enable SAVE to detect polymorphic and 
metamorphic malwares efficiently against 8 malware 
scanners, their weakness is not being able to detect 
unknown malware. 
Another signature-free system to detect polymorphic 
malware and unknown malware  based on the analysis of 
Windows API execution sequences extracted from binary 
executable is called  Intelligent Malware Detection 
System (IMDS) (Ye et al. 2007). IMDS was developed 
using Objective-Oriented Association (OOA) mining 
based classification with large data set gathered for the 
experiment (29580 binary executables, of which 12214 
were benign binary executables and 17366 were 
malicious binary ones). For detection, a Classification 
Based on Association rules (CBA) technique such as 
Naïve Bayes, SVM and Decision Tree were used. The 
result was compared against anti-virus software‟s such as 
Norton, Kaspersky, McAfee, and Dr.Web. In 2010 the 
authors of IMDS had incorporated the CIDCPF method 
into their existing IMDS system with larger dataset, and 
called it CIMDS system (Yanfang et al. 2010). CIDCPF 
adapted the post processing techniques as follows: first 
Chi-square testing was applied and Insignificant rule 
pruning followed by using Database coverage based on 
the Chi-square measure rule ranking mechanism and 
Pessimistic error estimation, and finally prediction was 
performed by selecting the best First rule. Their results 
were good, but involved unbalanced test data while the 
training data was quite balanced. Also, the detection rate 
was for training set about 89.6% and the accuracy was 
approximately 71.4 and in the testing set about 88.2% and 
the accuracy was approximately 67.6 which still the work 
need to be improve to achieve higher detection rate and 
higher overall accuracy. 
In 2006, researchers (Kolter & Maloof 2006)  
described the use of machine learning and data mining to 
detect and classify malicious executables. They tested 
several classifiers including, IBk, naive Bayes, support 
vector machines (SVMs), decision trees, boosted naive 
Bayes, boosted SVMs, and boosted decision trees. Kolter 
found that support vector machine performed 
exceptionally well and fast as compared to the other 
classifiers.  Hence, for the obfuscated malware detection 
system, this research adopts SVM as a classifier for the 
detection of hidden malware that invariably uses API call 
sequence. 
API based features are not only good in classification 
of malware, but is also good in detecting injected 
malicious executable. DOME (Rabek et al. 2003) is a 
host-based technique that uses static analysis based on 
monitoring and validating Win32 API calls for detecting 
malicious code in binary executables. In a study on the 
performance of kernel methods in the context of 
robustness and generalization capabilities of malware 
classification (Shankarapani et al. 2010), results revealed 
that analysis based on the Win API function call provides 
good accuracy to classify malware.  
3 Methodology  
This section describes the overall methodology adopted 
as shown in Figure 1, which consists of three groups of 
processes;  In the first group, the following 3 steps have 
been employed: Step 1: Unpack the malware and 
disassemble the binary executable to retrieve the 
assembly program, Step 2: Extract API calls and 
important machine-code features from the assembly 
program, and Step 3: Map the API calls with MSDN 
library and analyse the malicious behaviour to get the 
API sequence from the binaries.  In the second group, 
after getting the API sequences from the binaries, the 
signature database is updated based on their API calls.  
This sequence is compared to a sequence or signature 
(from the signature database) and is passed through the 
similarity measure module to generate the similarity 
report.  In the third group, Mutual Information (MI) based 
Maximum Relevance (MR) filter ranking heuristics on 
the set of Win API function calls is used for feature 
selection of relevant features, which provides more 
information about the class variables than irrelevant 
features. After getting the best features on the set of Win 
API calls, supervised learning method has been applied 
that uses a dataset to train, validate and test, an array of 
classifiers.  Eight robust classifiers have been selected for 
this purpose, namely, Naive Bayes (NB) Algorithm, 
k−Nearest Neighbor (kNN) Algorithm, The Sequential 
Minimal Optimization (SMO) Algorithm with 4 
differents kernels (SMO - Normalized PolyKernel, SMO 
– PolyKernel, SMO – Puk, and SMO- Radial Basis 
Function (RBF)), Backpropagation Neural Networks 
Algorithm, and J48 decision tree. However, the 
classification methods require training data and data to 
validate the models that have been formulated. Therefore, 
K-fold cross-validation has been used for evaluating the 
results of a statistical analysis generating an independent 
dataset. Extensive testing and analysis performed on 
malware and benign datasets with different learning 
techniques have shown that 10 folds provide the best 
estimate of error. Having k=10 folds means 90% of full 
data is used for training (and 10% for testing) in each fold 
test. Evaluation (feature selection + classification) was 
done inside 10-fold cross-validation loop on all Malware 
and benign datasets. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. System overview of zero-day Malware 
detection methodology 
 
Our proposed methodology mainly focuses on the API 
call features and the similarity based detection for 
identifying unknown malware and classifying them with 
existing malware families. Figure 1 gives a system 
overview of the similarity based detection methodology 
adopted. Signature database has been used to statistically 
calculate and compute the similarity measures.  Eight 
distance measures have been adopted to analyse and 
differentiate between malware variants and benign 
executables from various families. The Signature database 
has been generated from the existing malware datasets to 
produce fingerprint or benchmark for each record based 
on the API calls that the executable programs had used as 
shown in table 1. 
The signature database has been used later in next 
section to measure the distances between the programs 
and subsequently the results are analysed to classify these 
programs based on their API call features. 
TABLE. 1 Database Signatures  
ID Called API Class 
Prg.1 
 
 
Malware 
Prg.2 
 
 
Malware 
Prg.3 
 
 
 
Malware 
Prg.5 
 
 
Benign 
Prg.6 
 
 
Benign 
.. … … 
 
4 Database 
We have gathered 66,703 executable files in total 
consisting of 51,223 recent Malware datasets and the 
remaining being benign datasets as shown in table 2. Such 
large malware datasets with obfuscated and unknown 
malware used in this research study have been collected 
from honeynet project, VX heavens (VX Heavens 2011) 
and other sources.  
The 15,480 benign datasets include: Application 
software  such as Databases, Educational software, 
Mathematical software, Image editing, Spreadsheet, Word 
processing, Decision making software, Internet Browser, 
Email and many others system software, Programming 
language software and many other applications. Both 
(Malware, Benign) have been uniquely named according 
to their MD5 hash value. 
 
TABLE. 2 Dataset 
Type Qty 
Max. Size Min. Size Avg. Size 
(KB) (KB) (KB) 
Benign 15,480 109,850 0.8 32,039 
Virus 17,509 546 1.9 142 
Worm 10,403 13,688 1.6 860 
Rootkit 270 570 2.8 380 
Backdoor 6,689 1,299 2.4 685 
Constructor 1,039 77,662 0.9 1,193 
Exploit 1,207 22,746 0.5 375 
Flooder 905 16,709 1 1,397 
Trojan 13,201 17,810 0.7 1,819 
5 Evaluation and Validation 
The classification algorithms require training data to train 
the formulated models, and testing data to test those 
models. Validation of the models is achieved by making a 
partition on the database of malware and benign for 
carrying out the experiments. The cross-validation is a 
technique used for evaluating the results of a statistical 
analysis by generating an independent dataset for 
Malware and benign. The most common types of cross-
validation are repeated random sub-sampling validation 
and K-fold cross-validation (Hand, Mannila, & Smyth, 
2001). For this research study of Malware and Benign 
classification, K-fold cross-validation has been selected 
for validation as it is commonly adopted for many 
classifiers (Witten and Frank, 2010; Bhattacharyya, etal 
2011).  
In k-fold cross-validation the data is first partitioned 
into k sized segments or folds. Then, k iterations of 
training and validation are performed such that within 
each iteration a different fold of the data is held-out for 
validation while the remaining k-1 folds are used for 
learning. The advantage of K-Fold cross-validation is that 
all the examples in the dataset are eventually used for 
both training and testing. Also, all observations are used 
for both training and validation, and each observation is 
used for validation exactly once.  
We have evaluated various algorithms based on the 
following standard performance measures: 
 True Positive (TP): Number of correctly identified 
malicious code,  
 False Positive (FP): Number of wrongly identified 
benign code, when a detector identifies benign file as 
a malware. 
 True Negative (TN): Number of correctly identified 
benign code. 
 False Negative (FN): Number of wrongly identified 
malicious code, when a detector fails to detect the 
malware because the virus is new and no signature is 
yet available. 
 True detection Rate (TP rate): Percentage of 
correctly identified malicious code. 
  
 False alarm Rate (FP rate):  Percentage of wrongly 
identified benign code, given by: 
 
 F-Measure: It is a measure of a test's accuracy by 
combining recall and precision scores into a single 
measure of performance, usually it is between 0.0 
and 1.0 closer to 1 is good and closer to 0.0 is poor. 
 
 Overall Accuracy: Percentage of correctly identified 
code, given by: 
 
 ROC curve: In a Receiver Operating Characteristic 
curve the true positive rate is plotted in function of 
the FP rate for different points. Each point on the 
ROC curve represents a sensitivity pair 
corresponding to a particular decision threshold. A 
test with perfect discrimination has a ROC curve that 
passes through the upper left corner (100% 
sensitivity). Therefore the closer the ROC curve to 
the upper left corner, the higher is the overall 
accuracy of the test. Usually, ROC area higher 
(closer) to 1 is considered good, and closer to 0.0 is 
considered poor. 
6 Supervised Learning Algorithms  
6.1 The Naive Bayes (NB) Algorithm 
The Naive Bayes algorithm (Kuncheva 2006) is one 
classification method based on conditional probabilities 
that uses a statistical approach to the problem of pattern 
recognition. Literature reports that it is the most 
successful known algorithms for learning to classify text 
documents, and further it is fast and highly scalable for 
model building and scoring reference. The idea behind a 
Naive Bayes algorithm is the Bayes‟ Theorem and the 
maximum posteriori hypothesis. Bayes Theorem finds the 
probability of an event occurring given the probability of 
another event that has occurred already. For instance, for 
a feature vector x with n attributes values  
, and a class variable ,  
. 
Bayesian classifiers can predict class membership   
with probabilities   for the feature vector x whose 
distribution depends on the class . The class  for 
which the probability is given by , is called the 
maximum posteriori probability that feature vector x 
belongs, and can be computed from  by Bayes‟ 
rule: 
 
 
It applies “naïve” conditional independence 
assumptions which states that all n features 
 of the feature vector x are all 
conditionally independent of one another, given , 
and Naïve Bayes assumption is calculated as follows: 
 
  
 
 The most probable hypothesis given the training 
data „Maximum a posteriori‟ hypothesis results in the 
following:  
 
 
Among data mining methods, Naive Bayes algorithm 
is easy to implement and is an efficient and effective 
inductive learning algorithm for machine learning. Figure 
2 provides the overall accuracy rate for malware detection 
achieved through our experiments using Naive Bayes 
with k cross validations, k= {2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10}. 
 
 
Figure 2 Performance of Naive Bayes (NB) with k cross 
validations (k=2 to 10) 
6.2 The Sequential Minimal Optimization 
(SMO) Algorithm 
Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO) is a set of 
simple algorithms that can quickly solve the SVM QP 
problem, expand QP without any extra matrix storage and 
without using numerical QP optimization. The advantage 
of SMO is its ability to solve the Lagrange multipliers 
analytically. SMO is a supervised learning algorithm used 
for classification and regression, and it is a fast 
implementation of Support Vector Machines (SVM).  The 
basic advantage is that it attempts to maximise the 
margin, for example the distance between the classifier 
and the nearest training datum. SMO constructs a 
hyperplane or set of hyperplanes in an n-dimensional 
space, which can be used for classification. Basically, a 
separation can be considered good when the hyperplane 
has the largest distance to the nearest training data points 
of any class, since in general the larger the margin the 
lower the generalization error of the classifier. SMO has 
been selected to classify  malicious and benign 
executables because it is competitive with other SVM 
training methods such as Projected Conjugate Gradient 
"chunking", and in addition it is easier to implement in 
WEKA (Witten & Frank 2010).  
As shown in figure 3, we have employed 4 different 
kernels; Radial Basis Function Kernel (RBF), Polynomial 
kernel, Normalized Polynomial kernel, and the Pearson 
VII function-based universal kernel (Puk), and the overall 
accuracy rate for malware detection achieved through 
Normalized Polynomial kernel is the highest for all the k 
cross validations, k={2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10}. 
 
 
Figure 3 Performance of four Sequential Minimal 
Optimization kernels with k cross validations (k=2 to 10) 
6.3 Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) 
Algorithm 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) are biologically 
inspired form of distributed computing usually 
comprising of a set of nodes (including input, hidden and 
output) and weighted connections between them (Chen, 
Hsu, & Shen, 2005).  Guo and Li (Guo & Li, 2008)  
define ANNs as a topology/architecture formed by 
organizing nodes into layers and linking the layers of 
neurons. The nodes are interconnected by weighted 
connections, and the weights are adjusted when data is 
presented to the network during a training process 
(Dayhoff & DeLeo, 2001) 
A number of variations of neural networks are in use 
today in different applications, including in fraud 
detection. The use of ANNs in fraud detection spans 
almost all major forms of fraud including 
telecommunications fraud, financial fraud and computer 
intrusion fraud among others (Kou, Lu, Sirwongwattana, 
& Huang, 2004). In fraud detection and anomaly 
detection, ANNs are fundamentally used as classification 
tools (Chandola, Banerjee, & Kumar, 2009). Usually, 
anomaly detection approach using neural networks 
involves two steps: training and testing. First, the network 
is trained on some part of the data to learn the different 
classes. Then, the remaining portion of the data is used to 
run the network to test accuracy and other performance 
indicators.  
ANNs provide a non-linear mapping from the input 
space to the output space so that it can learn from the 
given cases and generalize the internal patterns of a given 
dataset (Guo & Li, 2008). Thus, ANNs adapt the 
connection weights between neurons and approximate a 
mapping function that models the training data provided 
for this purpose. Neural networks have the ability to learn 
distinct classes without knowledge of the data distribution 
(Chandola et al., 2009). However, most classifications 
rely on accurately labelled data which is often not readily 
available, especially for online banking and credit card 
fraud detection (Chandola et al., 2009). In Credit Card 
fraud detection, the FALCON system, which the 
developers claim to be in use by 65% of the credit 
systems worldwide, employs Neural Networks (FICO, 
2010). Furthermore, VISA, Eurocard and Bank Of 
America (among others) use Neural technology in their 
Credit Card systems (Aleskerov, Freisleben, & Rao, 
1997). The SAS fraud management system employs an 
ensemble of neural networks called Self Organizing 
Neural Network Arboretum (SONNA). Lastly, ACI„s 
Proactive Risk Manager (PRM) also features a neural 
network in its architecture (IBM, 2008).  
The downside to neural networks‟ distribution free 
generalisation is that they are prone to local minima and 
over-fitting (Bhattacharyya, Jha, Tharakunnel, & 
Westland, 2011). When the ANN is learning, a stopping 
condition may be declared as the anticipated net training 
error after a particular training session. This value is often 
a global minimum relative to the network‟s training 
errors. Sometimes, the ANN stops learning and gets stuck 
at a local minimum instead of the desired global 
minimum. This situation is most commonly referred to as 
the local minimum problem. Another problem with 
ANNs is hidden neuron saturation, where  the hidden 
layer inputs are too high or too low such that the hidden 
layer output is almost close to the bounds of the 
activation function at that layer (Wang, etal, 2004). The 
other drawback with ANNs is their lack of adaptation to 
new data trends. At any point, ANNs will model only the 
data they have been trained on.  This means that when a 
statistically different data pattern is introduced, the ANN 
will need to be re-trained or it may not correctly classify 
the new pattern. Consequently, this dictates that ANNs be 
retrained on a regular basis to keep up with emerging data 
trends. In online banking, ANNs are retrained after a 
defined period or after a certain number of examples have 
been collected.  
Recently, classification method using a NN was used 
for Malware detection. Generally, the classification 
procedure using the NN consisted of three steps, data 
preprocessing, data training, and testing. In our 
experiments, the data preprocessing was performed as the 
feature selection stage. In the data training, the selected 
features from the data preprocessing step were fed into 
the NN, and the classifier was generated through the NN 
for classifying the data as either Malware or Benign. For 
the testing step,  the classifier was used to verify the 
efficiency of  NN. In the experiment, an error BP (Back 
Propagation) algorithm was used. The best-known 
example of a neural network training algorithm, namely 
back propagation was employed. Back propagation 
algorithm within neural network was used because of the 
large amount of input/output data and the overwhelming 
amount of complexity due to the fuzzy outputs. Figure 4 
provides the overall accuracy rate for malware detection 
achieved through our experiments using Artificial Neural 
Networks with k cross validations, k= 
{2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10}. 
 
 
Figure 4 Performance of Artificial Neural Networks 
(ANN) with k cross validations (k=2 to 10)  
6.4 J48 Algorithm 
J48 classifier is a C4.5 decision tree used for 
classification purposes. In order to classify a new item, 
the classifier first needs to create a decision tree based on 
the attribute values of the available training data. So, 
whenever it encounters a set of items (training set) it 
identifies the attribute that discriminates the various 
instances most clearly. This feature that is able to tell the 
most about the data instances for classifying them the 
best is said to have the highest information gain. 
 
Figure 5 Performance of J48  with k cross validations 
(k=2 to 10)  
Among the possible values of this feature, if there is 
any value for which there is no ambiguity, that is, when 
the data instances falling within its category have the 
same value for the target variable, then that branch is 
terminated and the target value arrived is assigned to it.  
Figure 5 provides the overall accuracy rate for malware 
detection achieved through our experiments using J48 
with k cross validations, k= {2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10}. 
6.5 K-Nearest Neighbors (kNN) Algorithm 
kNN is a simple supervised machine learning algorithm 
used for classifying objects based on closest training 
instants in the feature space. It has been used in many 
applications in data mining, statistical pattern recognition 
and many others. The object is classified based on a 
majority vote of its k nearest neighbors at closest distant 
from the object. 
In our experiments, the K-nearest neighbors are 
compute as follows with K: 
 Store all training samples   in memory. 
 Determine the parameter K = number of nearest 
neighbors beforehand. (A good k can be selected 
using cross-validation for example).  
 Measure the distance between the query-instance 
(x) and all the training samples . (any distance 
algorithm can be used to )  such as: 
 
 Find the K-minimum distance between the query-
instance (x) and each K  
 . 
 Get all categories of training data for the sorted 
value under K.  
 Find the weighted distance of the query-instance 
(x) from each of the k nearest points as follows: 
 
Figure 6 provides the overall accuracy rate for 
malware detection achieved through our experiments 
using K-Nearest Neighbors with k cross validations, k= 
{2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10}. 
 
Figure 6 Performance of K-Nearest Neighbors (kNN) 
with k cross validations (k=2 to 10)  
7 Results of the Study 
The implementation involves employment of several 
software such as; WEKA version 3.6.4 software for 
performing the classification, and MatLab for feature 
selection. Table 3 shows the effectiveness of different 
data mining approaches. We had applied k cross 
validation, with k={2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10} for each of the 
data mining algorithms, and we observed that with k = 10 
most of the algorithms provided the best accuracy. By 
comparing the evaluation measures achieved by each of 
the data mining techniques, we observe that SVM - 
Normalized PolyKernel has performed the best, and NN-
Backpropagation exhibited the worst results. This could 
be attributed to the fact that and NN-Backpropagation 
follows a heuristic path and usually converges only to 
locally optimal solutions and can suffer from muliple 
local minima, while SVM - Normalized PolyKernel 
always finds a unique global minimum. Through our 
experimental analysis we found that SVM-Normalized 
Polynomial Kernel provided an average of 98.5% true 
positive rate. With 99% true detection rate of malware as 
malware, the average weight for the false alarm rate 
achieved was about 0.025 in this case. Overall, SVM-
Normalized Polynomial Kernel had outperformed all 
other classiﬁcation methods in all measures, namely, TP 
Rate, FP Rate, Precision, Recall, F-Measure and ROC 
Area.  
8 Conclusion 
Countermeasures such as antivirus detectors are unable to 
detect new malware and are in search of employing 
effective techniques, since the latest new malware adopt 
obfuscations to evade detection.  With an exponential 
growth in unknown malware arising from innumerable 
automated obfuscations, there is a need to establish 
malware detection methods that are robust and efficient. 
In this paper, we have proposed and developed a machine 
learning framework using eight different classifiers to 
detect unknown malware and to achieve high accuracy 
rate. In this work, iterative patterns based on Windows 
API calls have been used and statistical measures have 
been adopted to further improve the classification results.  
Our experiments conducted on large malware datasets 
have shown very promising results achieving more than 
98.5% accuracy rate.  
Overall, the salient achievements of the research 
reported in this paper are: 
- The proposed machine learning framework has 
resulted in high accuracies in malware detection. This 
is attributed to the unique feature selection of API 
sequences and the development of a fully-automated 
system used for evaluating data mining algorithms on 
large datasets of unknown malware. 
- The proposed system is efficient as it uses filter 
approaches to be able to successfully detect malware 
with a smaller feature set.  The term frequency of 
reduced API feature set using SVM (normalised poly 
kernel) has performed the best among the eight 
classifiers evaluated in this study. 
- The system is signature-free and does not require 
knowledge or detailed study about the API sequence 
of execution to classify a malware. 
 
   
 
TABLE 3 Results  
 
  
TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure ROC Area Class 
J48 
  0.919 0.057 0.947 0.919 0.933 0.931 Malware 
 
0.943 0.081 0.913 0.943 0.928 0.931 Benign 
Weighted 
Avg. 
0.93 0.068 0.931 0.93 0.93 0.931 
 
KNN 
 
0.938 0.041 0.962 0.938 0.95 0.966 Malware 
 
0.959 0.062 0.933 0.959 0.946 0.966 Benign 
Weighted 
Avg. 
0.948 0.051 0.948 0.948 0.948 0.966 
 
NB 
 
0.913 0.094 0.915 0.913 0.914 0.94 Malware 
 
0.906 0.087 0.904 0.906 0.905 0.936 Benign 
Weighted 
Avg. 
0.91 0.09 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.938 
 
NN - 
BackPropagation 
(Worst results) 
 
0.983 0.301 0.82 0.983 0.894 0.744 Malware 
 
0.699 0.017 0.966 0.699 0.811 0.839 Benign 
Weighted 
Avg. 
0.864 0.183 0.881 0.864 0.859 0.783 
 
SVM - 
Normalized 
PolyKernel  
(Best results) 
 
0.99 0.018 0.982 0.99 0.986 0.981 Malware 
 
0.981 0.031 0.969 0.981 0.983 0.982 Benign 
Weighted 
Avg. 
0.986 0.025 0.976 0.986 0.984 0.982 
 
SVM - PolyKernel 
 
0.966 0.102 0.913 0.966 0.939 0.932 Malware 
 
0.898 0.034 0.96 0.898 0.928 0.932 Benign 
Weighted 
Avg. 
0.934 0.069 0.936 0.934 0.934 0.932 
 
SVM - Puk 
 
0.901 0.033 0.968 0.901 0.933 0.934 Malware 
 
0.967 0.099 0.898 0.967 0.931 0.934 Benign 
Weighted 
Avg. 
0.94 0.064 0.94 0.932 0.932 0.939 
 
SVM- Radial Basis 
Function (RBF) 
 
0.94 0.084 0.925 0.94 0.933 0.928 Malware 
 
0.916 0.06 0.932 0.916 0.924 0.928 Benign 
Weighted 
Avg. 
0.929 0.073 0.929 0.929 0.929 0.928 
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